This study aims at providing a positive contribution to the literature on the macroeconomic determinants of poverty which is particularly relevant since this type of analysis is rather scarce (e.g., Agénor, 2005) . After a brief review on the macroeconomic mechanisms of poverty and deprivation, we propose a composite poverty index that captures seven deprivation dimensions which, relying on the literature and data availability, are important to a comparative assessment of deprivation across developed countries. The sample includes 24 countries of the European Union, from 2005 to 2010. Moreover, relying on the macroeconomic transmission mechanisms that influence poverty, a panel data econometric approach is implemented in order to study the relation between the proposed composite index and macroeconomic variables. The analysis is also extended for the AROPE, the European headline indicator for poverty targeting. Results show that a multidimensional poverty concept is relevant for assessing deprivation in developed countries and that, in line with the relevant literature, the dynamics of some macroeconomic variables is crucial to deprivation performances. The latter result is robust as it holds for different measures of poverty.
Introduction
Poverty is defined nowadays as a multidimensional phenomenon, but it took a lot of time for social, in particular, economic research to attain this stage of maturity. Currently, it is recognized as encompassing virtually all features characterizing the human being (e.g., Akoum, 2008) . Fighting poverty is now at the top of the political agenda of the most relevant international institutions, like the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
Nevertheless, despite this evolution of the concept, some caveats still persist when it comes to the measurement of the different dimensions of poverty and also on how to encompass them.
Further discussion on the concept is needed.
Some authors (e.g., Agénor, 2005 , Eurostat, 2010b claim that research relating macro aspects with poverty are rare, and emphasize that, in order to better understand poverty and contribute to its reduction, microeconomic decisions must be encompassed with macro outcomes. So, it is crucial to study, in detail, the macroeconomic transmission mechanisms focused on the poor and the socially excluded ones. Such an analysis demands an incursion into a complex matrix that covers not only economic growth and poverty, but also macroeconomic stabilization and institutions.
After a brief discussion around the concepts of poverty and deprivation, this study briefly reviews the macroeconomic determinants, as well as the corresponding mechanisms, related to the phenomenon. In the second part of our analysis, we proceed with an empirical approach to the subject. Since measurement issues are still highly debated in this field, we implement a review on studies focused on assessing poverty. This review is our departing point to propose our own measure, the Index of Multiple Deprivation for Developed Countries (IMD_D), to assess deprivation in 24 countries of the European Union (EU), from 2005 to 2010. This index aims at encompassing and measuring different deprivation dimensions, specifically meaningful for developed countries and differs from the European headline indicator for poverty targeting (AROPE) as it weights across macro-based indicators.
Finally, based on our IMD_D, we use an econometric model to analyse if the macroeconomic variables, pointed out in the literature, are able to explain the evolution of IMD_D. The results of this exercise are then compared with the related literature in order to check for the robustness of the most relevant theoretical explanations. Robustness is additionally tested using the AROPE. This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 the concepts of poverty and deprivation, and measurement-related issues are revised. Section 3 offers an encompassing review on the literature about macroeconomics and poverty. The empirical part starts with Section 4 that presents our IMD_D index and continues in Section 5 with a panel data econometric study. Section 6 concludes.
Poverty and deprivation: concepts and measurement
The definition of poverty is not straightforward. Arthur Shostak shows how problematic this issue is, by claiming that poverty is such a personal experience that only the poor can understand it (in Misturelli and Heffernan, 2008) .
Many authors describe the evolution of the definition of poverty throughout time (e.g., Mabughi and Selim, 2006; Misturelli and Heffernan, 2008; Lomasky and Swan, 2009) . 1 Nowadays it is believed that poverty may be the result either of a social problem, a particular economic variable, or even of specific political choices. Moreover, the multi-dimensional concept of poverty is also related with the participatory paradigm. An individual that is powerlessness, voicelessness, can also be considered poor. Besides these aspects, there is another important reason for considering that poverty has a wide range of dimensions. Policies have a primary objective, but second order benefits may arise. For instance, policies targeted at improvements in health conditions not only improve the physical well-being, but also increase the incomeearning potential; or a specific policy that calls for a better education will not only improve learning abilities but will also lead to better health outcomes and to higher incomes (World Bank, 2000) . Thus, policies targeted to a specific dimension can influence other dimensions of poverty.
Vulnerability is also an important issue inherited from the 1980s to study poverty situations.
Studies on poverty are normally snapshots of the present, the actual poverty, but it is necessary to study what will happen in abnormal circumstances (seasonal stresses, shocks, etc.) that can make movements into and out from poverty. This is crucial to assess the potential poverty of a society, characterised by gender of individual or types of families that are more in risk to become poor (Mabughi and Selim, 2006) .
Poverty in these new layers of complexity is also synonymous of ill-being (state of mind, in the sense of being opposite to well-being), i.e., someone that suffers from any kind of deprivation (money, shelter, food, etc., or social and psychological needs) has higher probability of being psychologically affected (mental distress, breakdown, depression, madness, etc.), and this affects the individual's experience of life (World Bank, 2000) . Then, the term poverty covers a wide range of individual experiences and is associated with the concept of deprivation.
In fact, the concept of deprivation intends to capture a wider understanding of poverty, going beyond income to consider the effects on basic human needs as health and wellbeing (Jones and Chant, 2009) .
Anything that creates exclusion from the widely accepted lifestyle of a community can be traced as poverty as it may deeply affect the individual. Combating poverty should be the main objective of both national and international institutions. As Silva (2010: 61) stresses, "involuntary poverty is a violation of the human rights and because of that should be placed on top of the agenda of the international institutions".
these dimensions can be found from the beginning of the 20th century (Mabughi and Selim, 2006) . In the 1970s the concept has evolved from taking a minimum of nutrition or subsistence level as a benchmark, to the need for keeping up with the standards prevalent in a given society, taking into account not only the lack of income but also the lack of access to health, education, and basic social services (Mabughi and Selim, 2006) . The 1980s brought new layers of complexity to the concept of poverty, namely within the conceptualization of capabilities proposed by Sen (1999) . Misturelli and Heffernan (2008) (Sen, 1992) . This approach also complements somehow the monetary income view, because poverty as a lack of material things can be viewed as limited and partial (Misturelli and Heffernan, 2008) .
Despite this complexity, a working definition is required. Lomasky and Swan (2009) , among others, identify two types of contemporary definitions of poverty. The definitions can invoke absolute or relative measures, i.e., if we have a society in where everyone's wealth increases the same, the absolute poverty will decline, yet, relative poverty will stay the same. Absolute poverty refers directly and only to the poorer classes: if their wealth increases, the index shows a decline of absolute poverty. Relative poverty compares the situation across different classes of income, increasing or decreasing with streams in the gap between classes. Relative poverty is more used in developed countries, but nowadays is also increasingly used in less developed and developing countries (Mabughi and Selim, 2006) .
It is important to acknowledge that, related to these distinct definitions (despite a strong agreement towards a more comprehensive definition of poverty), important discussions when it comes to measurement methods of poverty and/or on how they encompass all the dimensions of poverty definition are present. Although the currently widely-accepted definition of poverty is much more comprehensive than monetary poverty alone, indexes capturing the latter have still great importance. No doubt such indexes are very limited in capturing a wide-ranging definition of poverty but, from an economic point of view, like Misturelli and Heffernan (2008) argue, they are very useful. It is easier to measure and separate the poor from the non poor just by defining a poverty line but, as they fail to capture the full experience of poverty, makes also understandable why these measures are not fully accepted from a social point of view. Thereby, economic studies are usually discussed by several authors/institutions on the basis that monetary poverty indexes do not encompass all the important aspects of poverty; however, it is, in fact, very difficult to integrate all the different dimensions of poverty (Atkinson, 2003) . The biggest advantage of this method is the clarity of the definition. No one will ever argue that poverty is not related to lack of money; in fact, rising the earnings of the poor will result in improving all the others characteristics (health, education, shelter, etc.) . Of course improving the earnings should be tackled by giving people the skills to ensure, for themselves, a decent life. Social welfare, only by itself, can be directly linked with poverty and, thus, individuals or households dependent on social welfare systems can be defined as poor people (Silva, 2010) . Also, monetary poverty convinces for the simplicity of measurement and the ease to compare across different cases. That is why most of the academic studies and international reports still use this method (Silva, 2010) .
The most usual way to measure monetary poverty is to define a poverty line based on the proportion of individuals or households earning less than a given level of income (Agénor, 2005) . In developing countries the poverty line may vary from 1 to 2 dollars for day, the first describing extreme poverty and the second a most generous criterion (Silva, 2010) . But other indicators are now also used by the World Bank and OECD to study the incidence of poverty, like the life expectancy at birth, mortality rate, prevalence of diseases, households without water, sanitation, electricity, households that use their house to business purposes, households of seven persons or more, etc.
Instead, for developed countries, the monetary indicators have some different characteristics.
Normally, the poverty line is defined as having income below 40, 50 or 60% of median income of a specific country (Alves, 2010; Silva, 2010; World Bank, 2000) . Another usual method is the Gini coefficient. This is mostly used to measure the disposable income inequality in each country. The coefficient varies between 0 (complete equality) and 1 or 100 (complete inequality). But other indicators are also used, like per capita energy consumption, migration rates, road fatalities, suicide rates, public expenditure in health, import and export of goods and services, individuals without internet or washing machine, school enrolment, unemployment, literacy rates, etc. (e.g., http://www.worldbank.org).
There is a long list of indicators but, and besides the problems in measuring each dimension of poverty, there are further difficulties in how to encompass all the dimensions in a single index. Atkinson (2003) discusses the problem of integrating in a measurement method different dimensions of the definition of poverty. Some authors prefer a unified approach while others prefer an interaction measure; i.e., some are more concerned about those who have a low income or a low quality house or low quality education, while other authors are concerned with those who have a low income and both a low quality house and education. There are also problems in measuring the dimensions uncovered by the capabilities view. The first problem is that the value functions (the several things people may value doing or being) can run from elementary ones (the need to avoid diseases, etc.) to very complex activities or personal states (the need for self respect, etc.). And secondly, functions can change according to society (Mabughi and Selim, 2006) .
Since millions of individuals continue to suffer lives of deprivations and the policies against poverty continue to be powerless in some regions (Agénor, 2005) , the evolution in the concept of poverty brought not only a measurement problem of how to encompass all the different dimensions of deprivation, but also the need for economic policy to find alternative ways to fight it.
Some authors, like Agénor (2005) , defend that more macroeconomic-oriented research is essential to a better targeted intervention. In this context, the next section reviews the literature on the intrinsic transmission mechanisms that establish the links between macroeconomic performance and poverty.
Poverty fundamentals
Agénor (2005) sustains that works relating macro aspects with poverty are rare, and the papers that do exist are normally underrated because, while focusing on the transmission mechanisms of macro shocks to the poor in developing countries, they fail to capture, for instance, the complex nature of labour markets. Hence, the author points to the need to redirect research on converging macroeconomics with poverty reduction goals. He stresses that microeconomics has been the central scientific approach used to fight against poverty, whereas macroeconomics has been, to this regard, mostly neglected. Moreover, he complains that economists suffer from lack of research interest in poverty subject, being only preoccupied with measurement aspects. However, to reduce poverty, microeconomic decisions must be encompassed with macro outcomes.
In order to better understand the links between poverty and macroeconomics, in the short-, medium-and long-run, we rely on a literature review to discuss the intrinsic transmission mechanisms, aggregated into three groups: i) those that have a major influence on poverty through the economic growth channel, ii) the ones capturing the links between macroeconomic stabilization and poverty, iii) and those induced by the institutional environment, influencing both the economic growth and the stabilization mechanisms.
Economic growth and poverty
In order to eradicate poverty, some authors like Epaulard (2003) , Agénor (2005) , and Akoum (2008), defend 'pro-poor growth' policies. This new term is now widely used in both academic and international policy environments, and growth, by itself, is seen as the most important characteristic to push a society out from poverty. Epaulard (2003) focus the importance of growth, but also emphasizes the importance of the distributional patterns. The larger median income is, the more will be the impact of growth on poverty reduction. Ames et al. (2001) also sustain the importance of the so called 'growth effect' in order to achieve poverty reduction and emphasize two important characteristics that can affect the mechanisms through which growth impinges on poverty reduction: distributional patterns and sector composition. In a poverty reduction strategy, growth would be more efficient if distributional patterns were improved at first but, if not, growth will, in the end, push for such improvement, as growth, by itself, improves the distributional patterns (Ames et al., 2001) .
Enhancing the quality of growth by increasing the growth share to the poor is essential: thus, policies that reform land tenure, change marginal and average tax rates, and increase pro-poor social spending, should be used. The second characteristic emphasized by the authors is normally related to the conventional wisdom that growth strategies, linked with poverty reduction strategies, should be biased towards sectors where poor people are more allocated to.
However, as the authors highlight, these kind of actions can actually influence positively the poor's situation in the short run but, in the long run, they can contribute to increase poverty rather than decreasing it (e.g., if investments are mainly allocated to agriculture, they will have positive influence in decreasing rural poverty in the short run, but the increased dependence on this activity may, over the long run, intensify output variability). So, growth strategies should not be conducted only towards one sector; instead, these strategies should focus on removing distortions that constrain growth in any sector.
Nevertheless, some authors disagree on the negative relation between growth and poverty.
For instance, Akoum (2008) concludes that although some countries have experienced high growth rates, they have not necessarily exhibited a decrease in poverty. This may be related with macroeconomic instability and/or poverty traps. Developed countries usually use external aid to help inducing growth in developing countries. Agénor (2005) defends that establishing empirically the existence of poverty traps is a crucial step for sensible policy design since the relevance of aid to growth is frequently statistical insignificant, and when positive and significant, it is relatively small (Agénor et al., 2008) . In an effort to assess empirically how poverty traps relate with low savings and productivity, Kraay and Raddatz (2007) do not seem to find strong evidence to support this relation, which casts doubts on the underlying theoretical motivations for the existence of poverty traps. It is important to recall that, in general, poverty traps related literature points to low savings rates at low levels of development, a sharp increase at intermediate-development ranges, levelling out at high development rates, and to a sharp increase in productivity once a certain level of development is achieved. Kraay and Raddatz (2007) seem to stress the opposite. The paper identifies sharp increases in savings at very low capital stocks, then a flat section followed by another increase in savings section for high capital stock levels. As for productivity, only constant and moderate increasing returns are found.
Therefore, the association of poverty traps with low savings and productivity does not seem to be empirically relevant.
Kraay and Raddatz (2007) also reject the relation between aid, investment, and growth, since it finds no evidence that aid will be necessary to influence the 'initial jump' to run away from poverty. Moreover, the results also do not support the idea that aid raises investment. Easterly (1999), cited by Kraay and Raddatz (2007) , finds that this effect is positive and statistical significant in only 17 out of 88 countries, while no support is found for the relation between investment and growth. This lack of evidence does not mean that aid is not important; only that the relation should be more carefully analyzed by incorporating the quality of public institutions. The issue on institutions will be further discussed in Section 3.3.
According to Azis (2008) , although many authors argue that growth is by itself one of the most important determinants to reduce poverty, this claim is incomplete. The effects of growth cannot and should not be generalized. Clarifying the specific effects of growth on the poor of each country is essential to choose the right policies. The quality of the distributional patterns is also too general, because this quality problem requires more explanations on how the distributional patterns can be improved while still preserving growth. Tarabini (2010) also argues that economic growth is insufficient for poverty reduction and that education is essential to fight poverty. Being so, a strong investment in education should be a priority in national development strategies since education can positively influence productivity, economic growth and social development. Furthermore, Petrakis and Stamatakis (2002) show that primary education is essential to increase productivity levels and growth in low-income countries, being the importance of the secondary education more moderate, but still high. Instead, higher education levels seem to be more advantageous to growth and development in wealthy developed countries. As the level of development increases, the countries need higher levels of education that will generate higher levels of labour productivity. The two processes, education and development, are, thus, complementary.
The investments on pro-poor programs and on efficient delivery of essential public services are also crucial (public education, public health, social welfare, infrastructure, etc.). Moreover, public investment can also enhance private investment (Ames et al., 2001 ).
In the next subsection, and since macroeconomic stabilization may also be directly or indirectly (as a means to achieve economic growth) related to poverty, we will focus on the main mechanisms that, to this respect, are referred amongst the literature.
Macroeconomic stabilization and poverty
Stability exists when economic relationships are balanced (e.g., domestic demand/output, payments/domestic revenues, savings/investments, etc.). However, stability does not mean that deficits or surpluses cannot exist; instead, it just requires that they are financed in a sustainable manner. Defining an economic situation as stable or unstable is not straightforward, being necessary to look at a combination of key macroeconomic variables (e.g., inflation, growth, public sector deficit and debt, current account deficit, international reserves). Economic instability is normally associated, among others, with stagnant or declining Gross Domestic Product (GDP), double-digit inflation rates, high and rising levels of public debt, and large current account deficits financed by short-term borrowing. Moreover, it has two main sources:
exogenous shocks (e.g., natural disasters, terms of trade shocks, reversals in capital flows, etc.) and inappropriate policies (loose fiscal or monetary policy stance).
Macroeconomic instability hurts more the poor, relatively more vulnerable to, for example, high inflation rates and recessions. According to Ames et al. (2001) , and by the same line of reasoning, any poverty reduction strategy should be financed in a sustainable and noninflationary manner, in order to maintain macro stability. Hence, policymakers should define a set of attainable macroeconomic targets (i.e., inflation, external debt, growth and net international reserves) to sustain macroeconomic stability, and pursue macroeconomic policies (monetary, exchange rate, and fiscal) accordingly. Macroeconomic stability is essential to economic growth, and also for this reason macroeconomic stability should be promoted. Ames et al. (2001) point to an important consequence of low or negative output growth in a country:
the 'hysteresis' phenomenon. This phenomenon operates typically through shocks to the human capital of the poor: e.g., poor families' children tend to abandon school during crises, which will influence negatively poverty in long run.
Macroeconomic stabilization is, among others, characterized by the maintenance of low inflation goals that, by itself, appears to be essential for poverty reduction. Inflation can have a direct impact on poverty. In fact, poor people allocate a large share of their income to subsistence and, so, changes on the prices of goods and services that the poor consume, or changes on the government expenditures, significantly matter to them (Agénor, 2005; Ames et al., 2001) . If the goods that are consumed in large amounts are kept under control by the government, inflation may have little impact on the poor; otherwise, it will affect negatively and significantly the poor. Reduction in subsidies of goods and services will have similar effects.
The behaviour of overall inflation also matters because poor people are more vulnerable to inflation than higher-income groups. Poor people income is normally defined in nominal terms, not benefiting from indexation mechanisms. Moreover, they lack access to assets such as land or art objects that are not subject to inflation depletion. Hence, lowering the level of inflation can benefit the poor.
Nevertheless, some authors, namely Azis (2008) , claim that these effects of inflation cannot and should not be generalized. Clarifying the effects of inflation on the poverty line or the effects of output reduction on the income of poor households is essential to choose the right policies. In fact, disinflation can also be critical to all society, including the poor, if it is accompanied by a contraction of the aggregate demand and employment. This will increase labour supply which may lead to downward pressures on wages, increasing poverty. Also, a reduction of the inflation level through tight macroeconomic policies increase real interest rates and reduce growth rates through the effect of the former on the level and efficiency of investment.
Changes in aggregate demand correspond to another macroeconomic transmission channel that may have impact on poverty through changes in employment and wages (Agénor, 2005) ; e.g., fiscal shocks like wage cuts in the public sector may directly raise the poverty rate, particularly if it happens during periods when economic activity is subdued or in the absence of a proper safety net, since the public sector employees have normally low wages. Reduction in government transfers, cuts in current spending on goods and services or capital spending may also increase poverty by reducing the demand for labour and the aggregate demand.
Macroeconomic policies that change aggregate demand by affecting private spending are also possible (Agénor, 2005) ; e.g., fiscal adjustments such as increases in tax rates on wages or profits lowers the expected profit and net rate of return on capital, which may reduce private expenditure on consumption and investment, lowering the aggregate demand. Another way of lowering private expenditures is based on restrictive credit through tight monetary policy.
Conversely, cuts in public expenditures can also increase private expenditures if they reduce the cost or increase the availability of bank credit to the private sector, increasing aggregate demand. Additionally, fiscal adjustments that reduce government expenditures also reduce the pressures for monetarization of the deficit, which may pull inflation down.
Real exchange rate appears also to be a crucial macroeconomic variable in affecting poverty.
In order to understand how a depreciation of the real exchange rate can affect the poor, we need, first, to know where the poor are predominantly allocated in terms of economic activity and, second, if the poor tend to consume more of imported goods relative to non-tradable goods (Agénor, 2005) . A real depreciation increases the prices of imported goods and fosters a reallocation of resources towards (agricultural) export sectors, raising the income of the corresponding workers (farmer and rural households). Inequalities in poverty may arise, because rural poverty can be decreasing while urban poverty is most probably increasing; this happens because while a reallocation of resources towards the agricultural sector is being made, the demand for labour in the urban areas can decrease, and also because the poor from urban areas tend to consume more imported goods, that are more expensive after the real depreciation.
Moreover, the increase in the prices of imported goods (machinery and equipment), if not accompanied by a cut in tariffs, may reduce the demand for skilled workers. If we assume that skilled and unskilled workers are substitutes, the demand for unskilled workers will increase, raising employment and income for the poorer (as the poor are usually less skilled). If cuts in tariffs are implemented, the prices for imported goods may actually fall, raising the demand for skilled workers, and the opposite situation may occur. If the economy depends on crucial imported intermediate inputs (in particular, commodities), demand for labour may decrease, unemployment may rise, and poverty may increase. Hence, the external competitiveness of a country can have a direct impact on the poor (Agénor, 2005) .
It is also important to refer that business cycles have asymmetric impacts on poverty.
Recessions and crises tend to increase poverty rates significantly, whereas expansions tend to have a more limited effect. Hence, the ability of the institutional framework to smooth these cycles is essential. Recessions reduce the demand for labour and tend to put downturn pressures on wages, raising unemployment in the formal sector (Agénor, 2005) . In developing countries, with rather imperfect credit markets and where no state benefits for the unemployed are available, individuals cannot afford to stay for long time unemployed, so they will move to the informal and the rural sectors. This will tend to put downturn pressures on wages in these two sectors as well. Also, in a recession, firms tend to fire first the unskilled workers while keeping the skilled ones. When the crisis ends, firms have incentives to recover the productivity losses.
Given the high complementarity between skilled workers and physical capital, firms may be tempted to increased fixed investment instead of hiring unskilled workers. Hence, any pro-poor macroeconomic policy should aim at smoothing economic fluctuations, particularly, downturns (Epaulard, 2003) .
Furthermore, among other authors, Ames et al. (2001) claim also that countries should support structural reforms in order to improve and strengthen flexibility in markets'
adjustments. Hence, quality of institutions seems also to be determinant for achieving lower stabilization costs. Since the quality of institutions appears as a crucial determinant either for economic growth or for macro stabilization, in the next section we bring the institutional framework into discussion.
Institutional framework and poverty
"Over the last decades, national governments across the developing world have implemented economic structural adjustment programs (ESAP)" (Marquette, 1997 (Marquette, : 1141 . ESAP programs have, within their principal objectives, decreasing state interventionism and improve regulation towards non-interventionism, privatization and deregulation. Some structural adjustments may have impact at the same time on growth and on stabilization, (e.g. reforms in the fiscal structure such as on budget and treasury management, public administration, and governance) will increase efficiency and transparency, benefiting the poor via the increase on efficiency per se and through the better use of public resources (Ames et al., 2001) . Several authors, for example Collier and Dollar (2001) claim that poverty reduction depends crucially on the quality of economic policy. So, changes in the institutional framework can have an important impact on both growth and stabilization, and thus, may be equally essential to affect poverty.
Tebaldi and Mohan (2010) also argue that improving the quality of institutions is an essential step to fight poverty. The other mechanisms (government transfers, aid programs, etc.), will have only a limited and a short effect on reducing poverty if improvements on the quality of institutions are left out of the strategy. Their paper suggests that policies designed for reducing poverty should start by considering the enhancement of institutions in developing countries as a precondition for economic development and poverty elimination.
As already mentioned in the previous section, macroeconomic volatility can arise due to domestic policy misconduct resulting from failures in the institutional design of policy authorities regarding objectives and procedures (Ames et al., 2001) . This biased policy framework can affect poor in various ways. As already referred, volatility tends to distort price signals and the expected rate of return to the investors, which may delay decisions and lower both private investment and growth rates. It can also lead to higher risk premium or credit rationing, and this will affect directly the capability of obtaining loans by individuals and small and labour-intensive firms, which may result in lower private investment and lower growth rates. Lower macroeconomic volatility signals higher policy credibility, which brings the benefits mentioned above. To this regard, policy credibility is an essential characteristic to promote. "If a policy lacks credibility, the private sector does not believe that the authorities are truly committed to their policy targets, and hence does not fully factor the authorities' targets into its inflation expectations, for instance when setting wage bargains" (Ames et al., 2001: 20) .
The absence of this characteristic can then be disastrous as private sector will feel the lack of commitment by the government, which can negatively influence private investment, job demand, inflation, etc. "Credibility can sometimes be enhanced by imposing restrictions on policy (i.e., limiting the degree of discretion of the monetary authorities), or by adopting specific institutional arrangements" (Ames et al., 2001:20) .
Policies aiming at removing market distortions and distortive regulation or at promoting trade liberalization can also be crucial to deliver higher growth and better stabilization because, among others, they will improve competitiveness and fairness in the labour market.
Additionally, trade liberalization and the improvement of social safety nets can smooth economic fluctuations (Ames et al., 2001; Epaulard, 2003) . According to Epaulard (2003) , during a period of economic downturn, per capita income declines, but a more open economy helps reducing the increase of poverty.
As for the need to dismantle corruption, the conventional literature usually goes within the quote: "[c]onventional economic thinking says that lower corruption reduces income inequality through various channels" (Dobson and Ramlogan-Dobson, 2009: 102) , and normally defends a negative circle-link between corruption and level of development or growth (Aidt et al., 2008; Gundlach and Paldam, 2009) . It is then expected that a corruption-free environment should support sustained growth and a more stable multidimensional environment, and that policies that fight against corruption should then be developed, improving the institutional environment.
In spite of this conventional wisdom about corruption, empirical works are rather inconclusive about the effects of corruption on poverty reduction. Aidt et al. (2008) show small or no impacts of corruption on growth if we are in the presence of weak quality institutions, being more harmful where good quality institutions are present. Epaulard (2003) also finds that corruption does not seem to have any effect on poverty and, according to his results, it is not possible to
show that less corruption is associated with more efficiency concerning the impact of growth in reducing poverty. Additionally, no evidence is found on that less corruption causes a smaller impact of economic downturns in increasing poverty.
Other studies show that aid is not, for itself, enough to induce economic growth; capable macroeconomic policies are also needed: "positive effects of aid on growth are conditional of 13 having 'good' institutions" (Agénor et al., 2008: 278) . Most of the results show that it is essential to improve aid but, alongside, the management of public resources should be reformed. 14 which is either at-risk-of-poverty, or severely materially deprived or lives in a household with very low work intensity (non-overlapping sum of indicators). Severe material deprivation rate is defined as the percentage of population facing four out of nine material deprivation items: 1)
Inability to face unexpected financial expenses; 2) Inability to afford paying for one week annual holiday away from home; 3) Arrears (mortgage or rent payments, utility bills or hire purchase); 4) Inability to afford a meal with meat, chicken or fish, every second day; 5) Inability to keep home adequately warm; 6) Enforced lack of a washing machine; 7) Enforced lack of a colour TV; 8) Enforced lack of a telephone; and 9) Enforced lack of a personal car.
A first multidimensional assessment of poverty for Portugal, when compared with the European Union (UE27) average, using those indicators and covering also monetary poverty is provided by Rodrigues and Andrade (2010) . Both can be measured in terms of incidence (number of people that suffers from poverty or deprivations) or intensity (how much poor or how much deprived households are). Monetary poverty is measured using the poverty line defined as 60% of the median of the equivalent disposable income, while material deprivation tries to cover material poverty in a broader sense, using the above indicators. Rodrigues and Andrade (2010) propose different types of weighting for the indicators in the index composition: data driven, normative and hybrid weights. Using the first method, the weight of each item is taken from the data and refers to the percentage of people that have that particular item, i.e., the larger the proportion of population with access to a certain item, the higher the weight of the item because it reflects higher society preferences. The second methodnormative weights -uses equal or arbitrary weight for all the items. The third method is directly based on reported individual's perceived importance attached to each item. They first use normative weights and give equal weight for all indicators, and second use the hybrid weight, being this last methodology the one Rodrigues and Andrade (2010: 14) give more importance, since it "...
[has] a strong advantage over the other two types of weights because they avoid the argument between the 'is' and 'ought to be' methods". Across weighting methods, the hybrid method's results are robust in showing a significant reduction on the number of deprived and consistent poor (people that are both poor and deprived) in Portugal, being the results even lower than the poverty incidence, which makes these results oppose the results of the Alkire and Santos (2010) . But when the normative method is used, the deprivation incidence is stronger than the poverty incidence, a result in the same direction of those in Alkire and Santos (2010):
monetary poverty does not fully capture the effective proportion of poor people. This analysis shows that the weight of the indicators can deeply change the results.
Another work that uses a multidimensional index, adapted to the United Kingdom, is McLennan et al. (2011) . This index -the Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) -encompasses 7 dimensions (domains) with different weights: i) Income deprivation (22.5%); ii) Employment deprivation (22.5%); iii) Health deprivation and disability (13.5%); iv) Education, skills and training deprivation (13.5%); v) Barriers to housing and services (9.3%); vi) Crime (9.3%); and vii) Living environment deprivation (9.3%). The weights were set following the hybrid method (McLennan et al., 2011) . This latter index, differently from those in Alkire and Santos (2010) , Eurostat (2010a) and Rodrigues and Andrade (2010) , is not micro based. Micro-based indexes report the percentage of poor people, i.e., the percentage of people that is, simultaneously, deprived on a set of dimensions, or is below a minimum threshold for average dimensions.
Instead, McLennan et al. (2011) , is macro based, and for that reason indicators have a different interpretation implied by a different construction methodology. The IMD is an average weighted sum of scores that ranks, for a given moment in time, regions from the most deprived to the least deprived, taking into account the above-mentioned set of domains and corresponding indicators. Or, for a given country, the index allows accessing how average deprivation has evolved across time when compared with other countries. It is not possible to quantify how much more deprived a country is when compared with another one, being only possible to assess that a country is more deprived relative to the others. Following this idea, if a country scores 40 and other 20, is not possible to say that one country is twice as deprived as the
other.
An IMD-type index makes possible to identify the most vulnerable sectors of a society and to separate the dimensions of poverty because one can identify on which dimension stronger deprivations exist. Therefore, in the specific context of our research, since we are interested in measuring multidimensional poverty for developed countries, the computed index we construct should follow more closely the dimensions, indicators and weights embedded in this last work.
Nevertheless, we will compare our results to the ones obtained using the reference AROPE indicator.
Index of multiple deprivation for developed countries: a proposal
Taking Eurostat. Nevertheless, the criteria for choosing the indicators should follow some rules, namely, they must: provide direct measures for the deprivation domains where they are included; be computed from an universe that covers the majority of the population in each country; be up-to-date; be ease to update on a regular basis. Notes: within each dimension, indicators have equal weights; rank ordering scores from 1, referring to the least deprived country, to a maximum value (no larger than the number of countries in the sample), referring to the most deprived country (if two countries have the same value on one indicator, they will score the same on the ranking).
After deciding which indicators to use, the next step is, following the methodology in where E is the transformed domain score, and r is calculated by dividing the domain ranking order for the maximum value in the ranking, R (r varies from 1/R for the least deprived country, to R/R for the most deprived country) 4 . The rank transformation through equation 4.1 enables to comprise the rank scores between 1 and 100, being that the countries scoring more than 50 are among the 10% most deprived for a given domain. Tables in Annex A show the transformed ranking for each domain. Table 4 .2 shows the countries that were, on average, among the 10% most deprived in each dimension (shaded areas in Tables in Annex A). We conclude from the table that Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary and Poland are among the most deprived countries in different dimensions, followed by Portugal, appearing two times and the United Kingdom and Belgium, with one record. The most deprived countries, across most of the dimensions, were the latest to join the European Union (1 of May of 2004) and are still nonparticipants in the Euro Area (Poland, Hungary, Latvia and Lithuania). We can, albeit timidly, conjecture that the co-investment from European funds and the monetary and fiscal discipline are non-negligible for the performance in terms of deprivation. As for the Education, Skills and
Training deprivation dimension, Malta is, in all years, the most deprived country, followed by Portugal and Spain.
The next step was to calculate the IMD_D through a weighted average across the transformed domain scores for each country/year. Results can be seen in Annex B. Table 4 .3). Hence, the IMD_D shows that deprivation is growing worse in Portugal, as well as in relative terms to the EU. Source: Own calculations (see Table B .1 in Annex B).
However, if we look to the AROPE measurement, comparative to the EU27 Eurostat data, absolute, and relative to EU, deprivation is rather stable (see Table 4 .4). Motivated by these results and those presented in Alkire and Santos (2010: 30) , in Figure 4 .2 we compare the monetary poverty (MP) indicator, measured by the "at-risk-of-poverty rate"
(poverty line defined at 60% of the national median equivalised disposable income) and the reference indicator AROPE with the IMD_D. figure) . Whether, for the countries performing worse under the IMD_D, evaluation is rather similar using the AROPE but, MP clearly underestimates overall deprivation assessment.
Moreover, only in 2 countries -Latvia and Italy -relative deprivation can be assessed either on the basis of MP alone, AROPE or with the IMD_D. Clearly, it is not indifferent the use of an AROPE-like indicator or an IMD_D indicator. Crucially, in the former case, poverty assessment does not rely in weighting across dimensions and thus, reducing any form of deprivation weights the same to achieve poverty reduction. 
Deprivation and macro mechanisms: a panel data analysis
After the construction of the IMD_D, and following the line of argumentation in the previous sections, we propose now to study the role of macroeconomic variables in explaining deprivation, as measured by the IMD_D index, using a sample of developed countries. For comparative purposes, we also produce a similar analysis using the AROPE (people at-risk-ofpoverty rate or social exclusion), the headline indicator to monitor the EU2020 strategy poverty target.
5 Since we have data for 24 countries during six years, we can use panel data methodology, which we next briefly review. To our knowledge, there is only one study capturing the macro determinants of European poverty using panel data; however, it follows a binary logistic approach and, for that uses a micro-based and single monetary poverty indicator; moreover, macro variables are rather scarce, limited to the level of GDP per capita and the unemployment rate (Eurostat, 2010b).
Instead, in our analysis we consider a panel data econometric model of the following type:
where:
• IMD_D it is the dependent variable for country i at time t;
• C is the common intercept;
• β is a vector of coefficients associated with the independent explanatory (macroeconomic) variables;
• it X is a vector of independent explanatory (macroeconomic) variables for country i at time t; • u it is the random term for country i at time t;
• i represents the i th cross-section unit (country); t represents time (t = 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010) .
Hence, there are a maximum of N=24 observations (countries) and a maximum of T=6 time periods (years). 6 We have a balanced panel that we estimate as a fixed effects model (FEM).
7 5 See methodological notes in Eurostat (2012), Population and social conditions -Statistics in focus 9/2012, at http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/product_details/publication?p_product_code=KS-SF-12-009. 6 See Section 4 for country and time lengths. 7 Since our cross-section units are not random drawings from a larger sample (our sample includes 24 out of the 27 members of the European Union), the fixed effects model seems more adequate than the random Considering the general formulation -the intercept changes both across countries and across time, FEM may be implemented by applying dummy variables to the intercepts. Hence, we may re-write equation 5.1 as:
• α i is the fixed effect for the i th country;
• γ t is the fixed effect for the t th period.
As mentioned before, the dependent variable in our model is the IMD_D (or the AROPE). In line with the arguments and mechanisms presented throughout Section 3, the literature points to some relevant macroeconomic variables that should be used as independent variables in the model: public investment, GDP growth rate, inflation, unemployment rate, government budget, and quality of institutions, among others. However, among those invoked by the literature, we chose to exclude, some variables from the model specification:
• Tax burden, referred as impinging negatively with poverty by some authors (Ames et al., 2001; Agénor, 2005) , was not significant at an individual level and, when added to the model worsened results on the significance for the other independent variables in use.
• Specific public investment variables, such as investment in education, consensually acknowledged as essential to fight poverty (e.g. Petrakis and Stamatakis, 2002; Tarabini, 2010) were also disregarded due to lack of related data across time and/or countries. We have opted, instead, to use the aggregate variable capturing overall public investment.
Thus, we have established the following explanatory macroeconomic variables as determinants of deprivation.
• I_GOV_GDP: public investment defined as general government gross fixed capital formation, as percentage of GDP; • PC_GDP: real per capita GDP;
• PC_GDP_GROWTH: per capita GDP growth rate, measured by the growth rate of per capita GDP in volume, as percentage change on previous year;
• GINI: Gini coefficient as a measure of disposable income inequality in each country;
• GOV_BUDGET: government net lending (+)/net borrowing (-) under the excessive deficit procedure, as percentage of the GDP;
• INFLATION: annual average rate of change of the harmonised index of consumer prices (HICP); effects model (Gujarati, 2004) . In order to estimate the model we use the software Eviews that provides built-in tools for testing fixed affects against random affects, and also for testing the joint significance of the fixed effects, cross-section or/and time series. Tables 5.1 to 5.4., below, report the tests made to sustain this choice.
• UNEMPLOYMENT: unemployment rate, annual average;
• WGI: governance index to capture the quality of the institutions in each country; it refers to the simple average of six indicators -the Worldwide Governance Indicators. 8 Running, under FEM for both cross-section and period fixed effects, the regressions using IMD_D or the AROPE, over the selected explanatory variables and a constant term, Eviews provides the test for the nature of the fixed effects. Test results are presented in Table 5.1 and   Table 5 .2, below. (Kaufmann et al., 2010: 1) . Each indicator can vary between -2.5, for the worst, and 2.5, for the best performance of institutions. Both results strongly reject the null hypothesis that individual effects are uncorrelated with the other explanatory variables. Thus, the tests reinforce the option for a fixed effects model. Therefore, Table 5 .5 and Table 5 .6 show the model estimation results for the specification chosen. Agénor et al. (2008) argue that public investment can enhance private investment, which may boost growth and, consequently, reduce poverty/deprivation.
For the per capita GDP growth rate, a percentage point increase will reduce IMD_D by 0.29, keeping other things constant. Like we saw before, some authors, like Epaulard (2003 ), Agénor (2005 and Akoum (2008) , defend 'pro-poor growth' policies. Growth, by itself, is seen like the most important characteristic to push a society out from poverty. Nevertheless, some authors disagree on the negative relation between growth and poverty. For instance, Akoum (2008) concludes that although some countries have experienced high growth rates, they have not necessarily exhibited a decrease in poverty. We should not forget that our sample includes only developed countries and that, the indicators of deprivation clearly differ from those applying for the developing ones. As expected, the average level of income of a country is, for rather similar income dispersion, negatively related to deprivation measures. In particular, and among others, as the level of development increases, the countries will exhibit higher levels of education and lower corruption indexes that will generate higher levels of productivity (Petrakis and Stamatakis, 2002 , Aidt et al., 2008 , Gundlach and Paldam, 2009 evidence that the GDP per capita has a strong (and highly significant) direct negative effect on the risk of monetary poverty; this effect is somehow curbed when combined with higher education attainment: higher education has a negative impact on poverty, but the lower the higher the GDP per capita.
Referring to the Government budget, if increased by a percentage point, the IMD_D will increase by 0.25, keeping other things constant. Although neither cycle-adjusted nor excluding temporary measures, this indicator can roughly capture the fiscal policy stance, contractionary or expansionary. A fiscal contraction reduces government spending (pensions, transfers, etc.) and/or increases government revenues (taxes). On the contrary, expansionary policies increase government spending and/or reduce government revenues. Relying on the literature, poverty is (asymmetrically) pro-cyclical (Epaulard, 2003) ; according to Agénor (2005) , when government increases taxes or decreases transfers or public spending, it mostly deteriorates the living conditions of the poorer (those less qualified, more dependent on social assistance and on public services).
Inflation and unemployment are traditional macroeconomic stabilization indicators, usually correlated. According to Ames et al. (2001) , macroeconomic stabilization is crucial to fight poverty. While inflation is not significant, unemployment is highly statistically significant and exhibits the expected sign. The higher the unemployment rate, the higher the deprivation index, as it reveals to be an important mechanism biased towards the low-skilled and the poorer (Agénor, 2005) . Eurostat (2010b) also finds that an additional percentage point in the unemployment rate increases the poverty odds by 5%, ceteris paribus.
Finally, an increase by a percentage point in the governance index will reduce IMD_D by 9.77, keeping other things constant. In order to better understand this contribution it is important to have in mind that the aggregate indicators that compose the governance index are based on several hundred underlying variables, gathered at an individual level from a broad selection of existing data sources. Moreover, this data reflects the perceptions on governance of not only survey respondents but also public, private, and non-governmental organizations' experts from all over the world (Kaufmann et al., 2010) .
The above-mentioned results are common also for deprivation assessment using the AROPE indicator (see Table 5 .6). However, in this case, the Gini coefficient is highly significant: other things kept constant, a percentage point increase of the Gini coefficient increases AROPE by 0.57 percentage points. Ames et al. (2001) and Epaulard (2003) focus the importance of growth to fight poverty, but also emphasize the importance of the distributional patterns, the inequalities. Besides increasing material living standards and thus, affecting absolute poverty, the impact of growth on poverty reduction will be stronger the larger median income is (Ames et al., 2001) . In order to increase the growth share of the poor, policies, e.g., that reform land tenure, change marginal and average tax rates and increase pro-poor social spending should be put forward. Although also not statistically significant, inflation exhibits a positive impact on the people at-risk-of-poverty rate or social exclusion.
In sum, the results sustain our expectations about the signs of the explanatory variables, which are coherent with the relevant literature. Additionally, our model delivers a good fit.
Conclusions
What started as a material phenomenon has, nowadays, a multidimensional nature. Poverty is understood as material/social inclusion deprivation, which is rather encompassing. As we have seen, deprivation is measured by converging different indicators, and there are now a significant number of studies that follows this approach; furthermore, it is expectable that studies continue to appear in line. In fact, from the pure monetary poverty definition, the concept evolved through a multidimensional nature, even to include a capabilities approach.
Given the multidimensional nature of poverty, the phenomena became of rather difficult measurement in order to encompass different deprivation dimensions. This effort has recently been made and applied for assessing poverty in developing countries. However, to our knowledge, no index exists to compare poverty across developed nations. The AROPE does not weight across different dimensions, looking at only three dimensions rather independently.
Since, obviously, the nature of deprivations differ from that in developing countries, we propose an index of multidimensional deprivation (IMD-D) and compare across 24 developed countries of the European Union.
Following the literature, macroeconomic performance reveals to be non-neutral for poverty dynamics, but research work on this matter appears to be rather scarce. We also contribute to the In the particular case of Portugal, it exhibited a gradual depletion in overall well-being:
IMD_D has been increasing since 2005, against a rather stable EU average; however, this dynamics is absent when we use the AROPE indicator, instead.
Since, as this study sustains, there seems to be insufficient research on the macroeconomic issues associated with poverty and deprivation, we have made an econometric application in order to scrutinize the main mechanisms put forward by the theoretical hypotheses. Applied to developed countries, our results confirm most of the theoretical arguments in terms of the expectable effects of relevant macroeconomic mechanisms. Other things equal, public investment, GDP growth rate, and governance quality, if increasing, impose downturn pressures on the IMD_D and the AROPE. These results seem robust because, from the literature, we can sustain that public investment alone, or through enhancing private investment, may boost growth and, consequently, reduce poverty/deprivation. Results are also in line with the literature on the positive effects resulting from aggregate demand (fiscal) expansions and from the improvements in the quality of the institutional framework: other things equal, contractionary fiscal policies impose upturn pressures on deprivation. Growth and per capita GDP levels are, alone, or, better, when complemented by inequality improvements, also seen as one of the most important characteristics to reduce poverty. However, the Gini coefficient is significantly inversely related to deprivation when using AROPE. Finally, poverty is pro-cyclical: a rise in the unemployment rates has positive significant impacts in both IMD_D and AROPE.
Further research on this matter is obviously in order. Given the multidimensional nature of poverty, other composite indicators, more refined, should be built, together with the development of others relying on micro data. Both would contribute to a robustness check on the main macroeconomic mechanisms that drive poverty in developed countries, and thus, to establish more focused policy objectives. This should, of course, be complemented by the release of updated and the production of new data. Moreover, higher frequency data would enable a deeper analysis on how the dimensions of deprivations evolve across the cycle phases.
Annex A: Transformed ranking per deprivation dimension 
